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Mandarin wh-conditionals as interrogative conditionals *
Mingming Liu
Rutgers University
Abstract This paper examines wh-conditionals in Mandarin Chinese. It argues
that wh-conditionals involve embedding two questions within a conditional, one in
the antecedent and one in the consequent. Transition from a Hamblin/Karttunen
question meaning to a conditional semantics is achieved by answerhood operators.
The meaning obtained in this way is simple and intuitive: answers to the antecedent
question already contains information to answer the consequent question.
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1 Introduction
Wh-conditionals refer to a type of construction found in Mandarin (Cheng &
Huang 1996; Chierchia 2000) and Udihe1 (Nikolaeva & Tolskaya 2001: 763, Baek
2016: Chapter 6), the defining property of which is that they contain one or more
wh-phrases in the antecedent clause matched by an equal number of seemingly
co-varied wh-phrases in the consequent. Below, (1) is a Mandarin illustration,2
where paraphrases (1a) (Cheng & Huang 1996; Chierchia 2000) and (1b) (Crain &
Luo 2011; Huang 2010) indicate two ways of thinking about its semantics.
(1) Zhangsan
Zhangsan
qing
invite
le
ASP
shei,
who
Lisi
Lisi
jiu
then
qing
invite
le
ASP
shei.
who
a. If Zhangsan invited X, Lisi invited X.
b. Lisi invited who(ever) Zhangsan invited.
The current paper concerns Mandarin wh-conditionals, but instead of going
immediately after them, we will start with a general introduction of Mandarin wh-
phrases. As will be clear in a minute, our endeavor to keep a unified story of
Mandarin wh-expressions creates certain challenges for analyzing wh-conditionals.
* Thanks to Veneeta Dayal for her help and patience. I am grateful to Mark Baker, Simon Charlow,
Gennaro Chierchia, Ivano Caponigro, Kyle Rawlins, Sha Zhu, Haoze Li, Jess Law, reviewers and
participants at SALT 26 for discussion and comments, and to Jacob Collard for careful editing.
1 A Tungussic language spoken in the southern part of Russian Far East.
2 Jiu is an adverbial conditional marker that usually appears in the consequent of a typical conditional
in Mandarin. I will treat it as semantically vacuous, and gloss it as ‘then’.
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Besides their role in interrogatives as question words as in (2a), Mandarin wh-
items have non-interrogative uses: they are interpreted as simple indefinites below
negation in (2b), as epistemic indefinites in the presence of modals in (2c), and they
contribute to universal force in the wh-dou construction (Cheng 1995; Lin 1996) in
(2d).
(2) Mandarin wh-expressions cf. Chierchia & Liao 2014: 1
a. Zhangsan
Zhangsan
qing
invite
le
ASP
shei?
who
‘Who did Zhangsan invite?’ INTERROGATIVE
b. Zhangsan
Zhangsan
mei
NEG
qing
invite
shei.
who
‘Zhangsan didn’t invite anyone.’ NEGATIVE
c. Zhangsan
Zhangsan
haoxiang
seem
chi
eat
le
ASP
shenme.
what
‘Zhangsan might have eaten something.’ EXISTENTIAL
d. Zhangsan
Zhangsan
shenme
what
dou
DOU
gei
give
le
ASP
ni.
you
‘Zhangsan has given you everything.’ UNIVERSAL
Crucially, Mandarin wh-phrases are restricted in their distribution (in words
familiar to syntacticians, they need ‘licensing’): they are fine with negation (and
other standard DE operators), modals and some focus adverbs like dou ‘even’, ye
‘also’, but are ungrammatical in positive episodic contexts as in (3). They are
Polarity Sensitive Items (PSIs)3 (Cheng 1997; Lin 1996; Liao 2011).
(3) * Zhangsan
Zhangsan
qing
invite
le
ASP
shei.
who
Intended: ‘Zhangsan invited someone.’
The polarity-sensitive property of Mandarin wh-phrases poses the following
challenge to a successful analysis of wh-conditionals: if the wh-phrases therein are
PSIs (as the literature suggests, eg. Cheng & Huang 1996: 133, Chierchia 2000: 36-
37), how could they be licensed in the consequent of a conditional, a straightforward
upward-entailing context, without triggering any epistemic effect?
Irene Heim (pc. to Cheng & Huang) already expresses this concern (Cheng &
Huang 1996: 133). The usual response one can find in the literature is that both
3 We construe the term PSI very broadly as including negative polarity items like ever, free choice
items like any/irgendein as well as epistemic indefinites, following Chierchia 2013.
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the antecedent-wh and the consequent-wh are licensed — as polarity items — by a
covert unselective binder (Cheng & Huang 1996: 133, Chierchia 2000: 36-37). This
now seems unsatisfactory in view of our deepened understanding of the polarity
system, due to Chierchia 2013.
A second challenge is more specific to the Chierchia-style system of PSIs (Chier-
chia 2013), within which a unified analysis of Mandarin wh-phrases is presented in
Liao 2011 and Chierchia & Liao 2014. In Chierchia’s system, PSIs are essentially
existentials (that obligatorily trigger alternatives), but how could an existential start
to sound like a definite (or a bound pronoun) — by co-varying with an antecedent-wh
— in the consequent of a wh-conditional?
Bearing the challenges in mind, we will look at wh-conditionals in detail. Below,
after reviewing previous accounts in §2, I present a novel analysis in §3 that treats wh-
conditionals as interrogative conditionals. Besides immediately explaining the wh-
challenge, the new proposal leads us to the discovery of a wide range of interrogative
properties of wh-conditionals, to be discussed in §4. Finally, §5 concludes.
2 Previous analyses
Two very different conceptualizations of wh-conditionals have been proposed. One
sees wh-conditionals as involving donkey binding (Cheng & Huang 1996; Chier-
chia 2000), the other relativization (Huang 2010; Crain & Luo 2011).4 The two
approaches assign distinct meanings to wh-conditionals, to which we turn now.
2.1 Unselective binding
Those who see wh-conditionals as donkey sentences usually use unselective binding
to get the truth-condition shown in (4).
(4) J(1)K=1 iff ∀x[invite(zs,x)→ invite(ls,x)]
There are two ways in the literature to get (4) compositionally. For Cheng &
Huang (1996), wh-words in a wh-conditional are treated as Heimian variables (Heim
1982) and a (covert) quantificational adverbs unselectively bind them. For Chierchia
(2000), the wh-items are existential quantifiers, but can be existentially disclosed
(Dekker 1993) and thus bound by the quantificational adverb in a wh-conditional.
2.2 Correlative/free relative
Instead of seeing wh-conditionals as donkey sentences, Crain & Luo (2011) take
them to be kin to correlatives/free.relatives and (1) to have the truth-condition in (5).
4 More syntactically oriented approaches include Bruening & Tran 2006 and Cheung 2006.
816
Mandarin wh-conditionals as interrogative conditionals
(5) J(1)K=1 iff invite(ls,σx[invite(zs,x)])5
There are several ways of achieving (5) compositionally. The standard treat-
ment of correlatives, following Dayal 1996 is to take the antecedent/correlative-
clause as a lifted definite (cf. Jacobson’s (1995) treatment of free relatives) and
the consequent/matrix-clause as the predicate, the two composed by functional
application. In the case of wh-conditionals, the antecedent in (1) will denote
λP.P(σx[invite(zs,x)]) and the consequent λx.invite(ls,x) (Crain & Luo 2011: 173,
Huang 2010: 46). Such analyses are called FR-based analyses in the paper.
Note that both accounts fail to explain the use of wh-morphology in wh-conditionals:
unselective binding fails because it needs to license wh-phrases — being polarity
items — in the consequent of a conditional; FR-based analyses fail because they
need Mandarin wh-phrases to be relative pronouns, which however is implausible:
outside wh-conditionals, wh-words are never involved in any form of relativization
such as relative clause formation or single free relatives. A new analysis is called for.
3 The proposal
We propose that wh-conditionals are interrogative conditionals, which differ from
ordinary conditionals simply in that their antecedents and consequents both embed
questions. We then assume a semantics of conditionals/counterfactuals that utilizes
exemplifying situations (Fine 2012), which helps us to keep track of the individuals
that exist in a situation. Finally, transition from Hamblin/Karttunen-questions to
conditionals is achieved by answerhood operators (Heim 1994; Dayal 1996; Beck &
Rullmann 1999). The main intuition behind this proposal is that a wh-conditional
express that answers to the antecedent question already contain enough information
to answer the consequent question. Next come some details.
3.1 Wh-clauses as Hamblin/Karttunen-questions
We take the wh-clauses in wh-conditionals to be questions and adopt a Ham-
blin/Karttunen semantics of questions (Hamblin 1973; Karttunen 1977), where
a question denotes a set of propositions — the set of its possible answers. To illus-
trate, suppose there are exactly three people besides Zhangsan in the domain — Bill,
Mary and Sue, and that inviting is irreflexive; then the question in (6) denotes the set
of propositions in (7).
(6) Who did Zhangsan invite?
5 This is the official semantics Crain & Luo (2011: 173) give, under their (19e). Their informal
paraphrase, which points to treating wh-conditionals as equatives, does not match their semantics.
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(7) J(6)K =

λ s.Zhangsan invited Bill in s,
λ s.Zhangsan invited Mary in s,
λ s.Zhangsan invited Bill ⊕Mary in s,

Note that we take propositions to be sets of situations (not worlds), since we are
going to adopt a situation-based semantics of conditionals in the next subsection.
3.2 A situation-based semantics of conditionals
The classical semantics of conditionals is based on possible worlds and similarity
relations among them (Stalnaker 1968; Lewis 1973), as in (8); following Stalnaker
1975, we also take all conditionals (indicative and subjunctive/counterfactuals) to
have the same core semantics.
(8) Jif p then qK = 1 at w∗ iff all of the closest-to-w∗ worlds in which p is true
are worlds in which q is true.
Kratzer 1981b, 2012 present a semantics of conditionals based on premise sets
as in (9). (9) is shown to be equivalent to (a version of) similarity-based ordering
semantics (Lewis 1981).
(9) Jif p then qK = 1 at w∗ iff every way of adding as many (propositional) facts of
w∗ to p as consistency allows reaches a point where the resulting set logically
implies q. (Kratzer 2012: 180).
For the purpose of capturing the intuitively felt covariation of the two whs in a
wh-conditional, we adopt a semantics of counterfactuals due to Fine 2012, which
uses situations/states.6
(10) Jif p then qK = 1 at w∗ iff any possible outcome of an p−state at w∗ contains
a q−state.7
6 Three points need mentioning: first, Fine’s situation semantics of conditionals has nothing to do with
donkey binding but aims at providing a general theory of conditionals just as Stalnaker/Lewis/Kratzer
— his main motivation being to invalidate substitution of logically equivalent antecedents and to
validate simplification of disjunctive antecedents. Second, Fine’s situation-semantics and Kratzer’s
(2014) situation-semantics have many differences (Fine To appear). But these differences are not
relevant for our purposes so we choose to work with Kratzer’s formulation. Some terminology:
whenever Fine says s is a p-state or s exactly verifies p, Kratzer says s exemplifies p. Whenever
Fine says s inexactly verifies p, Kratzer says p is true in s (and sometimes we will say s supports
p). Finally, to make another simplification, we will talk about exemplifying situations and minimal
situations interchangeably, which is justified in our case for we are not going to discuss propositions
that are divisive (such as propositions involve mass nouns and negative noun phrases). Standard
definition of minimality based on part-of applies for now, but will be revisited in the appendix.
7 Formally, w |= A >C if u|>C whenever t|−A and t→w u (Fine 2012: 237), where > is the counter-
afactual symbol, |− exact verification, |> inexact verification, and t →w u means extending t to u
according to facts (cf. Kratzer’s premise set) in w.
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We may modify (10) in a way that brings out its similarity to the premise
semantics in (9). Instead of adding premises into the antecedent proposition (its unit
set), we use premises to enlarge our antecedent-situation. The resulting (11) is the
semantics we will adopt for Mandarin conditionals, marked by jiu.
(11) Jp jiu qK = 1 at s∗ iff ∀s[s ∈ MIN{s : p(s) = 1∧Cs∗(s) = 1}→ q(s) = 1],
where C is conversational background.8
In words: a Mandarin conditional [p jiu q] is true at s∗ iff every minimal
situation s such that p is true at s, coupled with the conversational background
C obtained at s∗, is also a situation in which q is true.
Note that the semantics for conditionals in (11) looks different from the standard
situation semantics of conditionals used in the donkey anaphora literature (Berman
1987; Heim 1990; von Fintel 1994; Elbourne 2005). Donkey-situation-semantics
usually assigns (12) as the semantics of conditionals (see von Fintel 2004: (9)).
(12) Jif p then qK = 1 at s∗ iff
∀s[s ∈ MIN{s : p(s) = 1∧Cs∗(s) = 1}→ ∃s′[s≤ s′∧q(s′) = 1]]
(11) is stronger than (12): (12) checks whether we can extend an antecedent
situation into a consequent one, while (11) instructs us to construct a situation s based
on the antecedent and the conversational background, and then to check whether s
supports the consequent. Formally, since (11) can be obtained by strengthening the
≤ on the right hand side of→ in (12) into = (and consequents of→ are upward-
entailing), (11) is stronger. While motivation for (12) comes entirely from donkey
anaphora, the semantics in (11) is in the tradition of Lewis-Stalnaker-Kratzer and
aims to provide a general theory of conditionals/counterfactuals. It is interesting
to note that entirely different considerations lead to similar results. Finally, for our
purposes, it is important not to use (12). This is because we will be trying to keep
track of the individuals that exist in a situation, but allowing situation-extension —
adding more individuals into a situation, that is — will make the task difficult.9
8 Two points need mentioning: first, we need the outmost MIN because we have decided to choose
Kratzer-style non-exact situation semantics and classical ∧. If we were to choose Fine-style exact
situation semantics and non-classical ∧, the MIN would not be necessary. A non-classical situation
semantics ∧ looks like this: s verifies A∧B iff s is the fusion s1unionsq s2 of a state s1 that verifies A and a
state s2 that verifies B. Second, for simplicity, we are making a version of the Limit Assumption and
the Unique Assumption (Stalnaker 1968); that is, for any s∗ there is exactly one maximal premise set
that is compatible with p; we write (the conjunction of) the maximal premise set as Cs∗.
9 For a similar use of non-extending situation semantics, see Schwarz 1998 for an analysis of German
reduced conditionals that employs a matching relation between events, following Rothstein 1995.
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3.3 Answerhood operators as the glue
There is a tension here. Our semantics of conditionals works with propositions but
the wh-clauses are sets of propositions. How to get from sets of propositions to
propositions? We resort to answerhood operators (Heim 1994; Dayal 1996; Beck &
Rullmann 1999). Specifically, we adopt Dayal’s answerhood operator in (13), for its
ability to deal with uniqueness, to be discussed in §4.3.
(13) ANS(Q)(s∗) = ι p ∈ Q[p(s∗) = 1∧∀q ∈ Q[q(s∗) = 1→ p⊆ q]]
Given an evaluation situation s∗, applying ANS to a question Q gives us the most
informative proposition p in Q that is also true in s∗, if there is such a p (if no such p
exists, ANS(Q)(s∗) is undefined). To illustrate, suppose we are looking at last night’s
party sparty, and the host Zhangsan invited exactly two guests, Bill and Mary. In this
case, applying ANS to the question in (14) and sparty gives us the proposition that
Zhangsan invited Bill and Mary, as in (16).
(14) Who did Zhangsan invite?
(15) J(14)K =

λ s.Zhangsan invited Bill in s,
λ s.Zhangsan invited Mary in s,
λ s.Zhangsan invited Bill ⊕Mary in s,
. . .

(16) ANS(J(14)K)(sparty) = λ s.Zhangsan invited Bill and Mary in s
The proposition in (16) can be embedded under the semantics of conditionals
provided in the previous subsection. We turn to such a semantics next.
3.4 wh-conditionals as interrogative conditionals
Now we can try to derive the meaning of wh-conditionals from the general semantics
of Mandarin conditionals in (11), as in (17).
(17) Semantics of wh-conditionals:JANS(QA)(s∗) jiu ANS(QC)(s∗)K = 1 in s∗
iff ∀s[s ∈ MIN{s : ANS(QA)(s∗)(s) = 1∧ PRE(QC)(s) = 1}→
ANS(QC)(s∗)(s) = 1]
In words: every minimal situation that supports the answer to QA in s∗ and
the presupposition of QC supports the answer to QC in s∗.
The connection of (17) to (11) is obvious. In both of them, we check whether
every situation that exemplifies the antecedent coupled with the conversational
background also supports the consequent. There are two differences: first, wh-
conditionals embed questions while ordinary conditionals embed propositions; this
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motivates the use of answerhood operators. Second, different from ordinary con-
ditionals, wh-conditionals can be seen as having a nearly empty conversational
background C — it has only the presuppostion of the consequent in it. This isn’t
very hard to imagine, since conditionals do have different modal flavors (Kratzer
1981a, 2012), captured by varying choices of coversational backgrounds, and wh-
conditionals are in this sense, a species of conditionals.
Next, notice the use of PRE in (17), which is a presupposition extractor. Here,
we follow Karttunen & Peters 1976 in taking questions to carry existential presup-
positions, and (17) says that the minimal antecedent s we select has to support both
the antecedent answer and the existential presupposition of the consequent question.
This is plausible, since presuppositions can be seen as requirements on prior contexts
(and thus on the situations constructed out of them), and antecedents of conditionals
are prior contexts for their consequents.
An illustration. Suppose in s∗ Zhangsan invited John and Mary, and Lisi invited
Bill and Sue. (1) is false in s∗: the minimal situation s that supports the answer to
who did Z invite? in s∗ and the presupposition of QC (an existential presupposition
that L invited someone) consists of zs, ls, j
⊕
m; s does not support the answer to
QC in s∗— that L invited Bill and Sue. In general, our semantics using minimal
situations guarantees that the short answer to the consequent question is identical to
the antecedent-short-answer, thus capturing the ‘co-variation’ of the two wh.
It needs to mentioned that many technical details are bracketed away in (17).
They will be discussed in the appendix.
4 The wh-puzzle and other interrogative properties of wh-conditionals
A question perspective not only solves the wh-challenge introduced in §1, but also
helps us see a wide range of interrogative properties of wh-conditionals.
4.1 The use of wh-morphology
First of all, our analysis based on questions immediately explains the wh-licensing
puzzle: wh-words in wh-conditionals (especially the consequent whs) are actually
question words, not the type of polarity sensitive items that need downward entailing
contexts (negative polarity items) or modal licensing (free choice items).
Even better, our analysis of wh-conditionals makes possible a unified analysis of
Mandarin wh items. We follow Chierchia & Liao’s (2014) proposal that all Mandarin
whs are existentials: question-wh and polarity-wh share the same existential seman-
tics, their difference being that polarity whs obligatorily trigger (domain) alternatives
and thus need covert ONLY to exhaustify them (Chierchia 2013), while question whs
do not trigger alternatives but need to appear in an interrogative context (in syntactic
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parlance, its +wh feature needs to be feature-checked by a question C head). We
call the latter Karttunen-existentials, and the former Chierchia-existentials. One
of the claims made in the paper is that the whs in wh-conditionals are Karttunen-
existentials. To be concrete, (18) gives a way to compose the question meaning
of Lisi qing shei? ‘who does Lisi invite?’ using Karttunen-existentials (Karttunen
1977) and the LF (with covert wh-movement) proposed by Huang (1982).
(18) CP
shei+wh
λx C′
CQ IP
Lisi invites tx
a. JIPK = λ s.ls invites x in s
b. JCQK= λq.p = q
c. JsheiK= λP∃x[people(x)∧P(x)]
d. JCPK = ∃x[people(x)∧ p = λ s.ls invites x in s]
λ−abstraction over p−−−−−−−−−−−→ λ p∃x[people(x)∧ p = λ s.ls invites x in s]
4.2 Quantificational invariability
Wh-conditionals do not exhibit quantificational variability, unexpected under unselective-
binding. Consider (19), with an overt quantificational adverb usually.
(19) Tongchang,
usually
Zhangsan
Zhangsan
qing
invite
shei,
who
Lisi
Lisi
jiu
then
qing
invite
shei.
who
Lisi usually invites who Zhangsan invites.
6≈ Lisi invites most people that Zhangsan invites.
Unselective binding gives wrong truth conditions for (19), as shown in (20).
(20) J(19)K=1 iff Mostx[invite(zs,x)][invite(ls,x)]
According to (20), (19) is true iff Lisi invites most of Zhangsan’s invitees, which
however is a meaning the sentence does not have. Instead, the sentence means for
most relevant situations, Lisi invited the people Zhangsan invited. The two are
different: suppose that there were three inviting situations/events in the past; in every
situation, there was exactly one person that Zhangsan invited but Lisi didn’t. In this
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case, (19) is false (they never invited the same group of people!) but (20) is most
likely to be true. It is clear then that tongchang ‘usually’ quantifies over situations.
Adding a situation variable to (20), as in (21), does not save unselective binding.
Intuitively, we want to quantify over situations that are large enough to hold all
of Zhangsan’s invitees given a particular inviting event. (21), which breaks big
situations into smaller individual-situation pairs, would be too fine-grained.
(21) J(19)K=1 iff Mostx,s[invite(zs,x,s)][invite(ls,x,s)]
Quantificational invariability is expected under our proposal. Our whs are exis-
tentials used in questions, and thus cannot be bound by adverbs of quantification. To
be concrete, we propose that quantificational adverbs in wh-conditionals quantify
over pragmatically determined subsituations of a topical situation (cf. Beck’s (2012)
analysis of comparative correlatives). (19) thus has (22) as its analysis.
(22) J(19)K=1 at s∗ iff
Most[λ s.s ∈Cov(s∗),λ s.JANS(QA)(s) jiu ANS(QC)(s)K = 1 at s]
In (22), we are looking at a plural situation s∗ that has as its parts subsituations
s (represented by Cov(s∗)) where Zhangsan and Lisi both threw a party. Then
(22) requires that for most s, the information needed for answering the antecedent
question (who did Zhangsan invite at s?) is enough to support the consequent
question (who did Lisi invite at s?). Since we are quantifying over party-situations,
not individuals, no quantificational variability is observed.
4.3 Uniqueness
Both the antecedent and the consequent of a wh-conditional exhibit uniqueness.
(23) Zs
Zs
qing
invite
na.liang.ge.ren,
which.two.CL.person
Lisi
Lisi
jiu
then
qing
invite
na.liang.ge.ren.
which.two.CL.person
Whichever two persons Zhangsan invites, Lisi invites them.
(23) has the presupposition that both Zhangsan and Lisi are presupposed to invite
exactly two persons. Unselective binding does not capture this presupposition.
In our proposal, both the antecedent and the consequent have an ANS applied
to a question, and this gives rise to uniqueness for both. We illustrate how this is
achieved by considering the antecedent. Suppose there are three people John, Mary
and Sue in the domain and invite is irreflexive. The antecedent question in (23) has
the denotation in (24).
(24) Jwhich 2.persons does Z invite?K=

λ s.Z invites John⊕Mary in s,
λ s.Z invites John⊕Sue in s,
λ s.Z invites Mary⊕Sue in s

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Next, ANS applied to the question in (24) and to the evaluation index s∗, delivers
the presupposition that there is a proposition in the question set that is true at s∗
and entails all the other true-at-s∗ propositions in the question set (see (13) for the
formalization; intuitively, the presupposition just requires that the most informative
answer be in the question denotation).
Now suppose Zhangsan invites three people, John, Mary and Sue, in s∗. All
the propositions in (24) are true-at-s∗ propositions, but none entails the other, and
thus there is no proposition in the question set that is true at s∗ and entails all the
other true-at-s∗ propositions in the question set. The presupposition of ANS is not
satisfied. In general, for the presupposition of ANS to be satisfied in (24), Zhangsan
has to invite exactly 2 persons. Uniqueness is captured.
4.4 Minimal wh-conditionals
Next let us consider (25), which has a upward scalar predicate gou ‘sufficient’ (Beck
& Rullmann 1999).
(25) duoshao
how.much
qian
money
gou
sufficient
chi
eat
kaoyao,
roast.duck
wo
I
jiu
then
gei
give
ni
you
duoshao.
how.much
a. I will give you the minimal amount of money sufficient to eat roast duck.
b. 6=for every amount of money x such that x is sufficient to eat roast duck, I
will give you x.
c. 6=I will give you the maximal amount of money that is sufficient to eat
roast duck.
(25) means that I will give you the minimal amount of money sufficient to eat
roast duck. Unselective binding, delivering (25b), does not capture this.
Even FR-based analyses (relying on classical σ ) do not work: σd. [d-amount of
money that is sufficient to eat roast duck] will take us to (25c), which fares no better.
(25) is captured by our proposal using Dayal’s (1996) answerhood operator.
ANS applied to the antecedent question in (25) picks out the most informative true
proposition in the question set, which involves the minimal amount of money dMIN
that is sufficient to eat roast duck (for all amount of money d,d′ such that d < d′, d is
sufficient to eat roast duck ⊂ d′ is sufficient to eat roast duck). The conditional part
then says that the situation contains dMIN should be able to support the consequent
answer; thus I have to give you the minimal amount of money that is sufficient to eat
roast duck.
4.5 Mention-some wh-conditionals
Consider (26), the antecedent of which is interpreted existentially.
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(26) nar
where
neng
can
maidao
buy
jiu,
liquor
wo
I
jiu
then
qu
go
nar.
where
‘I will go where I can get liquor.’
a. = I will go to some place(s) where I can get liquor.
b. 6= I will go to (all) the places where I can get liquor.
(26) intuitively means (26a): I will go to some place where I can get liquor. An
σ -based free relative (or unselective binding with covert universal) however can only
get us (26b). A similar example is given in (27), which obviously does not mean
that I will marry all the rich people.
(27) shei
who
you
have
qian,
money
wo
I
jiu
then
jia
marry
gei
to
shei.
who
‘I will marry someone who is rich.’
Existential wh-conditionals have a natural correspondence to mention-some
questions. We use a variant of Beck & Rullmann’s (1999) ANS3 (28), which they
propose to capture mention-some questions, to analyze existential wh-conditionals.10
(28) ANS(Q)(s∗) = λP∃p[P(p)(s∗) = 1∧Q(p)∧ p(s∗) = 1]
When applied to an embedded mention-some question Q, ANS3 requires Q to
quantifier raise above the embedding predicate. For example, John knows where you
can buy gas has the LF in (29).
(29) [ ANS3(where.you.can.buy.gas) [ λ p [ John knows tp ]]]
In our story, questions are embedded in conditionals, since we don’t want
questions to move out of the antecedent of a conditional, we need to modify (28). The
simplest way is to use choice functions (Reinhart 1997). Our ANSsome in (30) applied
to a question Q at s∗ will pick out one (among many) true-at-s∗ proposition in the
question set. Conditionals then can work with the proposition thus obtained. Finally,
we may choose to existentially close the choice function at the top. The resulting
truth condition of (26) is (31), which roughly says that the place I will go (right now)
is some place where I can get liquor, an intuitively adequate characterization of (26).
(30) ANSsome(Q)(s∗) = fCH(λ p[Q(p)∧ p(s∗) = 1])
(31) J(26)K= 1 in s∗ iff ∃ fCH∀s[s ∈ MIN#{s : fCH(λ p[QA(p)∧ p(s∗) = 1])
∧PRE(QC)(s) = 1}→ ANS(QC)(s∗)(s) = 1]
10 Our account is compatible with other ways of capturing mention-some readings of questions, such as
by appealing to pragmatic principles or partial answers. See Dayal To appear for relevant discussion.
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Of course, the use of ANSsome should be constrained to avoid over-generation
(not every question allows mention-some answers and not every wh-conditional
allows existential interpretation), but these contraints are not well understood in
the mention-some question literature (see Dayal To appear) and we are not going
into that in the paper. But at least one prediction is made within our analysis: since
wh-conditionals are built out of questions, whenever a question cannot receive a
mention-some answer, the corresponding wh-conditional does not have an existential
interpretation (the reverse does not hold since a wh-conditional might have its own
constraints not discussed in the paper which would block certain mention-some
questions). As far as I can see, this is a correct prediction. For example, a question
like the one in (32)) never allows a mention-some answer, and correspondingly the
wh-conditional built out of it (such as (23) never has an existential interpretation.
(32) Q:Zhangsan
Zhangsan
qing
invite
le
ASP
na.liang.ge.ren?
which.two.CL.persons
‘Which two persons did Zhangsan invite?’
A:#John and Mary, or Bill and Sue.
4.6 The exhaustive flavor
The consequents of wh-conditionals are interpreted exhaustively. Consider (33),
where the exhaustive flavor is indicated by the only/exactly in the gloss.
(33) Chi
eat
duoshao,
how.much
jiu
then
cheng
fill
duoshao.
how.much
Fill the plate with only/exactly the amount of food that you will eat.
Neither unselective binding nor a FR-based analysis captures this. Both of them
deliver a reading that can be roughly paraphrased as fill the plate with the amount of
food that you will eat, weaker than (33).
The exhaustive flavor does not seem due to pragmatic strengthening. First,
neither universal statements nor correlatives (Hindi correlatives for example) or
English free relatives are strengthened in this way. Second, the exhaustive flavour
does not disappear in downward entailing contexts, in contrast to other pragmatic
strengthening phenomena such as scalar implicatures which usually do (Horn 1989;
Chierchia 2013). Consider (34), where (33) is embedded under negation.
(34) Zhangsan
Zhangsan
meiyou
not
[wh-conditional chi
eat
duoshao,
how.much
jiu
then
cheng
fill
duoshao].
how.much
Zs didn’t fill the plate with only/exactly the amount of food that you will eat.
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The embedded wh-conditional in (34) is naturally interpreted exhaustively (indi-
cated by only/exactly in the gloss), suggesting a semantic way of capturing it.
The exhaustive flavor is captured by our proposal. Suppose in s∗ Lisi would eat
exactly 1 pound of rice but he filled his plate with 1.5 pounds of rice. (33) is false in
s∗ according to our proposal. This is because the minimal situation that supports the
antecedent question contains exactly 1 pound of rice, which is unable to support the
consequent answer which involves 1.5 pounds of rice. For (33) to be true in s∗, Lisi
would have to fill his plate with only 1 pound of rice. In other words, (33) has the
exhaustive flavor according to our proposal.
It is interesting to note that our proposal has used a weak exhaustive answerhood
operator to capture the so called strong exhaustiveness (strong exhaustiveness adds
to weak exhaustiveness, which only contains positive information, the negative
inference of only) (Groenendijk & Stokhof 1982). This is due to our use of mini-
mal/exemplifying situations. Within a situation semantics, we can say that p is a
strong exhaustive answer to Q in s∗ iff the exemplifying/minimal situation of p also
exemplifies ANS(Q)(s∗), while p is a non-exhaustive answer to Q in s∗ iff there
is an s which is an extension of the exemplifying situation of p and s exemplifies
ANS(Q)(s∗). This way of capturing strong exhaustiveness is similar to the posi-
tion Dayal To appear takes: p is a strong exhaustive answer to Q at w iff p is the
proposition expressed by ANS(Q)(w). For how to combine situation semantics with
Groenendijk & Stokhof’s semantics of questions, see Kratzer 2014.
4.7 Non-coreferentiality
As Lin 1999 points out, the two whs in a wh-conditional do not always co-refer. (35)
below does not mean I will choose the shirt that you choose. Instead, the two shirts
need only to match each other for the sentence to be true in the context described in
(35). More specifically, suppose that the girl is going to buy the Hermione-shirt that
is hanging on the wall right in front her; then the boy had better buy the Ron-shirt
that hangs next to it (Hermione-Ron and Harry-Ginny are couples in Harry Potter.).
(35) [StoreX sells matching shirts for young couples. A couple came in. The boy
said to the girl:]
ni
you
xuan
choose
nage,
which.one
wo
I
jiu
then
genzhe
follow
ni
you
xuan
choose
nage.
which.one
I will choose a shirt that matches what you choose.
Our proposal based on relations between situations (instead of relations between
individuals) allows for the extra flexibility to handle non-coreferentiality: suppose
the girl will buy the Hermione-shirt; the minimal antecedent situation s will consist
827
Liu
of the girl, the Hermione-shirt and the boy; since the boy cannot buy a Hermione-
shirt because of a contextual sortal mismatch (because boys don’t buy girls’ shirts!),
the Hermione-shirt’s male counterpart the Ron-shirt is added to s (we can say that a
matching function between shirts is salient enough in the context to be added into s;
after all, conditionals and modal expressions are highly context-dependent), and that
is the shirt the boy is going to buy.
5 Conclusion
Our guiding idea is that wh-conditionals are interrogative conditionals, with the sim-
ple meaning that the answer to the antecedent question contains enough information
to answer the consequent question. To cash out this intuition, we adopt situation
semantics as a way to encode partial information; then wh-conditionals basically say
the situation we construct out of the antecedent answer — plus presuppositions from
the consequent question and some pragmatic enrichment (see the Appendix) — is
enough to support the consequent answer.
Empirically, our discussion has established that a question perspective is essential
to an adequate understanding of Mandarin wh-conditionals. The claim is supported
by a wide range of interrogative properties exhibited by wh-conditionals such as
the use of wh-morphology, informativity-sensitivity, uniqueness and so on. This
question perspective sets our analysis apart from all existing proposals and points to
a new line of research.
Theoretically, suppose wh-conditionals are real conditionals. They constitute
another phenomenon where we can explore the interaction between alternatives and
conditionals, which has been studied in unconditionals (Rawlins 2013), conditionals
with disjunctive antecedents (Alonso-Ovalle 2009), and conditional questions (Isaacs
& Rawlins 2008). Furthermore, while the other phenomena all involve interaction
of conditionals with a single set of alternatives, the option of embedding two al-
ternative sets within a conditional semantics has not been discussed previously.
Our Q(uestion)+A(nswerhood.operator)+C(onditional) proposal illustrates how this
could be done. Finally, to deal with the interaction, we could either lift the condi-
tionals so that they directly work with sets of alternatives (Ciardelli 2016), or lower
the alternative sets to single propositions so that standard semantics of conditional
can work with. The Q+A+C proposal illustrates the second possibility.
Appendix: Technical details
In §3.4, we assign (36) (repeated from (17)) as the semantics of wh-conditionals.
We now spell out the technical details of the proposal.
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(36) JANS(QA)(s∗) jiu ANS(QC)(s∗)K = 1 in s∗
iff ∀s[s ∈ MIN{s : ANS(QA)(s∗)(s) = 1∧ PRE(QC)(s) = 1}→
ANS(QC)(s∗)(s) = 1]
In words: every minimal situation that supports the answer to QA in s∗ and
the presupposition of QC supports the answer to QC in s∗.
To see how (36) behaves, we need determine the minimal situations that support
both the antecedent answer and the consequent presupposition. Consider again (37).
(37) Zhangsan
Zhangsan
qing
invite
le
ASP
shei,
who
Lisi
Lisi
jiu
then
qing
invite
le
ASP
shei.
who
‘Lisi invited whoever Zhangsan invited.’
Suppose at last night’s party s∗37 Zhangsan invited exactly John and Mary. We
first check what is the set of situations S37 that support both the antecedent answer
and the consequent presupposition (without being minimal for now). There are
many such situations: s1= ZHANGSAN-INVITED-JOHN-MARY-&-LISI-INVITED-
JOHN-MARY-SUE11 is in S37, for s1 supports Zhangsan invited John and Mary
(the antecedent answer) and Lisi invited someone (the consequent presupposition);
similarly, s2= ZS-INVITED-JOHN-MARY-&-LISI-INVITED-JOHN is also in S37.
Now we consider the minimal situations within S37, MIN(S37). Standard MIN
used in situation semantics is based on part-of relation ≤s between situations.
(38) MIN(S) = {s ∈ S : ∀s′ ∈ S(s′ ≤s s→ s′ = s)}
Unfortunately, The part-of MIN in (38) does not work for our case. MIN(S37) delivers
only situations where Zhangsan invited John and Mary but Lisi invited exactly a
single person. For example, s1 6∈ MIN(S37) because there is a situation s3 =ZS-
INVITED-JOHN-MARY-&-LISI-INVITED-SUE in S37 that is a proper part of s1;
instead, s3 ∈ MIN(S37). This cannot be right: presumably we want s4 =ZS-INVITED-
JOHN-MARY-&-LISI-INVITED-JOHN-MARY to be in MIN(S37), but part-of MIN
does not allow that. I suggest we use a cardinality-based MIN# instead.
(39) MIN#(S) = {s ∈ S : ∀s′ ∈ S(|s′| ≤ |s| → |s′|= |s|)}
MIN# checks the cardinality of the atomic participants — these are thin particulars,
individuals abstracted away from their properties — in a situation.12 For example,
11 We use small capitals to refer to situations. ZHANGSAN-INVITED-JOHN-MARY-&-LISI-INVITED-
JOHN-MARY-SUE is the situation that exemplifies/minimally-supports the proposition that Zhangsan
invited John and Mary, and Lisi invited John, Mary and Sue.
12 MIN# is related to one of the two aspects of minimality – the individual minimality – discussed in
Van Benthem 1989. Individual minimality itself comes from Logic Programming (Lloyd 2012). For
instance, Prolog programs are supposed to ‘contain no individuals/objects except for those which are
explicitly named in the language of the program’ (Van Benthem 1989: 334).
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|s1| = 5 for there are 5 participants — zs, john, mary, ls, sue, while |s4| = 4 for there
are 4 — zs, john, mary, ls; consequently s4 but not s1 is likely to be in MIN#(S37).
It turns out the minimal number of participants a s in S37 can have is 4: every s
in S37 supports the antecedent answer, so s has zs, john, mary, and to support the
consequent presupposition s need include ls as well. As a result, every s in MIN#(S37)
has 4 atomic participants. There are exactly seven such situations in MIN#(S37).
(40) MIN#(S37)=

ZS-INVITED-J-M-&-LS-INVITED-J,
ZS-INVITED-J-M-&-LS-INVITED-M,
ZS-INVITED-J-M-&-LS-INVITED-J-M,
ZS-INVITED-J-M-&-LS-INVITED-ZS,
ZS-INVITED-J-M-&-LS-INVITED-ZS-J,
ZS-INVITED-J-M-&-LS-INVITED-ZS-M,
ZS-INVITED-J-M-&-LS-INVITED-ZS-J-M

(40) still does not quite work. The semantics for wh-conditionals in (36) would
require every s in (40) to support the consequent answer. This cannot happen since
the consequent answer (relativized to an evaluation situation) is usually unique.
I propose that the antecedent situations, besides being in MIN#(S37) (that is,
besides being the minimal situations that satisfy both the antecedent answer and the
consequent presupposition), have to satisfy two more constraints.
The first constraint comes from the idea that the presupposition of the antecedent
question (that Zhangsan invited someone) alone should not provide any information
that contributes to answering the consequent question — for if it were able to, a
simpler form such as Lisi invited Zhangsan would have been used to answer the
consequent question. In other words, we should discard any situation in S38 where
that Lisi invited Zhangsan comes out true. Essentially, this is a constraint that
favors constructing the antecedent situations using new instead of old (presupposed)
information. Here, I will however not try to formalize the constraint but simply use
NO.OLD to represent it.13 (41) below illustrates how it works.
(41) MIN#(S37∩NO.OLD(s))=

ZS-INVITED-J-M-&-LS-INVITED-J,
ZS-INVITED-J-M-&-LS-INVITED-M,
ZS-INVITED-J-M-&-LS-INVITED-J-M

The second constraint involves the idea that the antecedent should not contain
redundant information. In other words, every bit of new information conveyed by the
13 Formalizing NO.OLD is doable. First, we take the set of situations that support the presuppositions of
QA and QC – {s : PRE(QA)(s)∧PRE(QA)(s)}. We then apply MIN# to the set as what we did to S80; this
gives us the unit set {ZS-INIVTED-LS-&-LS-INVITED-ZS} =MIN#{s : PRE(QA)(s)∧ PRE(QA)(s)}.
Finally, NO.OLD in the case of S80 requires that none of the situations in S80 contain a subsituation that
itself is a subsituation of any situation in MIN#{s : PRE(QA)(s)∧ PRE(QA)(s)}. This is complicated,
and I believe an intuitive understanding of NO.OLD suffices.
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antecedent should be used to construct the antecedent situation. This can be translated
as a maximality requirement: among the situations in (41) constructed from previous
steps, the largest one gets selected since it contain the most information.
Putting everything together, we have (42) as the semantics of wh-conditionals,
with the underlined part encoding the maximality requirement.
(42) JANS(QA)(s∗) jiu ANS(QC)(s∗)K = 1 in s∗ iff
∀s[[s ∈ MIN#{s : ANS(QA)(s∗)(s) = 1∧ PRE(QC)(s) = 1∧NO.OLD(s)}∧
¬∃s′[s′ ∈ MIN#{s : ANS(QA)(s∗)(s) = 1∧ PRE(QC)(s) = 1}∧ s <s s′]]
→ ANS(QC)(s∗)(s) = 1]
Applying (42) to s∗37, we get {ZS-INVITED-J-M-&-LS-INVITED-J-M} as the set
of antecedent situations. (42) then requires every situation within the set should
support the consequent answer. We thus correctly predict that Lisi cannot invite
people other than John and Mary.
There is a last concern: suppose in a different scenario s∗39 Zhangsan invited
John and Mary, but Lisi invited only John. The intuition is that (37) is false in
this case. Our semantics so far predicts the contrary: the minimal antecedent
situation s we get (with the two constraints just discussed) is ZS-INVITED-J-M-
&-LS-INVITED-J-M. s supports the consequent answer that Lisi invited John, and
thus the wh-conditional in (37) is incorrectly predicted to be true. To deal with
this problem, I propose wh-conditionals further require that the minimal antecedent
situation we get does not contain subsitutations that themselves support both the
antecedent answer and the consequent answer. This part is underlined in (43).
(43) Semantics of wh-conditionals: OfficialJANS(QA)(s∗) jiu ANS(QC)(s∗)K = 1 in s∗ iff
∀s[[s ∈ MIN#{s : ANS(QA)(s∗)(s) = 1∧ PRE(QC)(s) = 1∧NO.OLD(s)}∧
¬∃s′[s′ ∈ MIN#{s : ANS(QA)(s∗)(s) = 1∧ PRE(QC)(s) = 1}∧ s <s s′]]
→ [ANS(QC)(s∗)(s) = 1∧
¬∃s′′[s′′ <s s∧ANS(QA)(s∗)(s′′) = 1∧ANS(QC)(s∗)(s′′) = 1]]]
(43) solves the problem with s∗39: the antecedent situation ZS-INVITED-J-M-
&-LS-INVITED-J-M contains a subsituation ZS-INVITED-J-M-&-LS-INVITED-J
that supports both the antecedent answer (that Zhangsan invited John and Mary) and
the consequent answer (that Lisi invited John), violating the underlined part in (43),
and thus the wh-conditional is predicted to be false in this scenario.
The formula in (43) is complicated, but I believe a large part of it should belong
to pragmatics, such as old information does not count, every bit of new information
should be used, and no redundant information should be provided. We thus back-
grounded these components in the main text in §3, trading perspicuity for precision.
The semantics in (17) is sufficient for the discussion in §4.
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